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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

DENNY ALVAREZ,

:

Case No. 920401 - CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (1953 as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by admitting
evidence tending to prove other bad acts.

The standard of review

applied to errors in admission of evidence is the correction of
error standard allowing no deference to the trial court.

State

v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991).
Was Defendant denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel because attorney Remal failed to call a witness which
could have bolstered Defendant's testimony while undermining the
prosecution witness's credibility?

1

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 401
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Utah Rule of Evidence 602
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he
has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to
prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of
the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is
subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to
opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
2

Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c)
The following definitions apply under this article:

(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 7, 1991, Denny Alvarez was arrested for
Armed Robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953 as
amended).

On November 14, 1991 this matter was heard in the

Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding.

The Defendant,

Denny Alvarez, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and
sentenced to a minimum term of five years imprisonment in the
Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a fine of One Thousand
Dollars.

On January 21, 1992, the Defendant appealed his

conviction to the Utah Supreme Court.

Pursuant to its authority,

the Utah Supreme Court transferred the Defendant's appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 7, 1991 Defendant, Denny Alvarez, entered the
Smith's Food King store at 876 East 800 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah and approached the customer service window where Vanessa
Milton was working (R. 271). Defendant testified that he had
been using drugs steadily for approximately a week and had hardly
slept during that week; he also testified that he had used
intravenous drugs, most recently just before entering Smith's (R.
264 & 273).
Ms Milton testified that Defendant stood at her customer
service window with some money in one hand and told her to give
4

him "six fifties"

(R. 185-186 & 197-199).

When she did not

comply with that request, she testified that he lifted his shirt
to reveal the handle of either a knife or a gun in his waistband
(R. 102-103).

She also testified that Defendant reached towards

the cash drawer, which was closed, and then left the store.
103).

(R.

Defendant testified that he was confused because of the

combination of the lack of sleep and the use of drugs, but that
he was simply trying to get 6 fifty-cent pieces for the 3 onedollar bills he had in his hand (R. 273, 276 & 279). When it
became clear that Ms. Milton was not going to give him the
change, he left the store (R. 280 & 281). Defendant also
testified that he never had any sort of weapon in the store, but
that Ms. Milton may have seen him holding onto the too-large
waistband of his pants in a manner which she mistook for a weapon
handle (R. 276-278, 280). When confronted by police a short time
after leaving the store, Defendant gave a false name because he
knew he had violated his probation (R. 220-221).
Prior to the beginning of trial, Defendant made a Motion in
limine to suppress any evidence of Defendant's having given a
false name, pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence; the court denied that motion, but limited the State's
evidence to the fact that Defendant had given a false name, and
did not allow any mention of Defendant's probation status.
At the end of the presentation of the State's case in chief,
Defendant moved to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence or, in
the alternative, to reduce the charge to Attempted Robbery, a
5

third degree felony, because Defendant neither used a dangerous
weapon nor threatened the use of a dangerous weapon as is
required as an element of Aggravated Robbery; those motions were
denied by the trial court (R. 255-261).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court allowed into evidence the testimony of
Officer Scharman that Mr. Alvarez gave an incorrect name and date
of birth at the time he was arrested for robbery.

However,

because Officer Scharman's testimony was not expert testimony,
and was based upon what another officer's report says, the
evidence should have been excluded as impermissible hearsay.
Moreover, the evidence going to Mr. Alvarez using a
different name and date of birth does not qualify as admissible
character evidence because it is not probative of any element of
aggravated robbery.
Even if the evidence is relevant, its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon the
defendant.

The incorrect name and date of birth evidence came in

without the benefit of Mr. Alvarez's explanation that he gave the
wrong name to avoid arrest on a probation violation.

The

evidence was misleading to the jury, who could not hear
Defendant's highly appropriate explanation for his behavior, and
was therefore substantially prejudicial to the defendant.
Defense counsel failed to call as a witness the person who
drove Mr. Alvarez to the Smith's that morning.
6

That witness

could have bolstered Mr. Alvarez's testimony while undermining
the prosecution witness's credibility.

Attorney Remal's failure

to call this witness was unreasonable under the circumstances and
prejudicial to Mr. Alvarez's defense.

ARQUMMIT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
ADMITTING EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE OTHER BAD
ACTS.

At trial, Mr. Alvarez's attorney moved that the State's
witnesses not be allowed to testify to any use Defendant may have
made of an incorrect name or date of birth at the time he was
arrested on the robbery charge being tried (R. 41 & 220). It was
proffered that Mr. Alvarez's explanation for using a false name
would be that he was on probation for a prior robbery and he
wanted to avoid any problems with probation (R. 220-21).

The

trial court had previously ruled inadmissible any evidence going
to Defendant's prior convictions or probation status (R. 33 &
220).

Mr. Alvarez argued that any mention of the false name

forced him to argue evidence that had been previously suppressed
in his favor by the trial court (R. 221). The state argued that
the evidence was admissible because it showed evidence of guilt
and it undermined the stated defense that Mr. Alvarez was too
high on drugs to think clearly (R. 222).
The trial court ruled the evidence admissible in that the
evidence did not constitute a crime or wrong as envisioned by
Utah Rule of Evidence 404b (R. 223) and that it was relevant with
7

a probative value outweighing the slight prejudicial effect (R.
222).

The trial court further admonished the witness that no

mention was to be made of probation status or prior record of Mr.
Alvarez (R. 223). The witness, Officer Scharman, acknowledged
that he understood the court (R. 225).
Officer Scharman testified in front of the jury that Mr.
Alvarez gave him the name of Joseph Madrid at the time of arrest
and a date of birth that was too young (R. 242). The evidence
establishing that Mr. Alvarez was not Joseph Madrid was not based
on the officer's direct knowledge, but rather was based on
hearsay, that is, the officer read the information in another
officer's report (R. 243-44).

Objections to the hearsay nature

of the testimony were overruled (R. 243-44).

The hearsay was

based on a comparative fingerprint study done between arrest
prints and "known prints of the defendant" (R. 244).
Mr. Alvarez took the stand in his own behalf (R. 263 & ff).
He explained that the encounter was a mistake.

He was trying to

get change in fifty-cent pieces from the service counter at
Smith's (R. 271). He was too high to communicate (R. 273). He
did pull his pants up but did not exhibit a knife (R. 277). He
finally reached for his own money and left the store (R. 280).
He never explained the name discrepancy but denied trying to rob
Smith's (R. 283).
The prosecutor argued in closing that Mr. Alvarez gave a
false name to officer Scharman (R. 322).

In rebuttal, he again

argued that Mr. Alvarez lied about his name and, therefore, was
8

lying about his intent that day (R. 341).

A.

THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE FALSE NAME WAS
NOT RELEVANT TO THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE
AND WAS THEREFORE NOT ADMISSIBLE.

Utah Rule of Evidence 402 provides in part that "(e)vidence
which is not relevant is not admissible."

Utah Rule of Evidence

401 defines "relevant evidence" as:
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.
Therefore, the proponent of any evidence objected to on relevance
grounds has the burden to show that the offered evidence is
relevant as defined above.

State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316-17

(Utah 1986) .
1.
This evidence in its actual form at trial
did not provide admissible evidence that
Mr. Alvarez had given a wrong name or date of
birth.
On direct examination, Officer Scharman testified to the
false name and date of birth in this manner:
Mr. Spikes:
his name?

What name did he give you when you asked him

Officer Scharman:
I believe it was Joseph Madrid, or
something of that nature
Q:

And what date of birth did he give you?

A:
I don't recall exactly. I just recall that the date of
birth, he was a juvenile age.
(R. 242). Mr. Alvarez did not testify as to his date of birth or
the use of the name Joseph Madrid (see ruling of court R. 221).
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The only evidence offered going to show that Mr. Alvarez gave
false information other than the interchange above was in the
form of hearsay evidence (R. 243-44).

Officer Scharman testified

he did not realize the name might be false until later on:
Mr. Spikes:
Did you have occasion to discover that the
name he gave you was not, in fact, his true name?
Officer Scharman:
No, sir, I didn't, not until I was
subpoenaed and pulled the case up and read some
supplementary reports.
(R. 243; hearsay objection by Mr. Alvarez followed).

The

objection was overruled and the questioning continued:
Mr. Spikes:
How was it that you, in fact, found that
there was at least some question concerning the name of
Madrid that he gave you?
Officer Scharman:

From a follow up detective.

Q:
Do you know what process, what procedure was taken that
would occur to determine that?
A:
There was a comparative fingerprint done from the print
I took at the time of the arrest versus some known prints of
the defendant.
Q:

Okay.

Do you know the results of that comparison.

(R. 243-44; hearsay objection by Mr. Alvarez again overruled).
Then the officer testified that the name and date of birth had
been incorrect at the time of arrest (R. 244).
This second exchange between the prosecutor and his witness,
which is the only evidence offered to show the information was
false, is not admissible evidence.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he
has personal knowledge of the matter.
Utah Rule of Evidence 602.

The witness is not competent to
10

testify to this information because he did not "have the
opportunity . . . to perceive" the fingerprint analysis himself.
State v. Eldredqe, 773 p.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1989), cert, denied 493
U.S. 814 (1989).

He was never gualified as an expert, nor was

his testimony found to be the kind necessary for expert
testimony.

Therefore, he did not meet the expert exception to

Rule 602.1
The fingerprint testimony was inadmissible hearsay (see Utah
Rule of Evidence 802).
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c).

The officer was testifying to what

another officer's report says, not to what he himself observed.
That second officer was not available at trial subject to crossexamination.2

This evidence should not have been admitted by

the trial court.

Gray at 1316.

The evidence as offered at trial establishes that Mr.
Alvarez probably gave the name of Joseph Madrid and perhaps gave
a juvenile date of birth.

No competent or admissible evidence

was offered to show that these pieces of information were indeed
false.

Mr. Alvarez himself was never guestioned on these

1

Rule 602 also provides that "(t)his rule is subject to the
provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert
witnesses."
2

The testimony, in addition to violating rules of evidence,
was also admitted in violation of Mr. Alvarez's right to
confrontation
of
witnesses
under
the
state
and
federal
constitutions.
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circumstances.

The jury can certainly assume that Joseph Madrid

was not the only name Mr. Alvarez was known to use.

No inference

about his date of birth can be drawn from these facts, however,
since juveniles can be tried as adults.

This does not lead to

the inference that he told a lie about his name or date of birth.
The prosecutor proffered that the information was relevant
because it showed evidence of guilt (probably meaning
consciousness of guilt) and showed that Mr. Alvarez was not too
high to think clearly.

However, the evidence which was

admissible is not probative of consciousness of guilt.

His use

of two names, which may both be valid, does not show that he was
lying to the officer, making it more probable than not that he
had a consciousness of guilt.

His use of two names does not make

it more probable or less probable that he was thinking clearly.
The evidence is not probative of any fact of consequence to this
charge.
excluded.

It is not relevant, and, therefore, should have been
State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1983).
2.
This evidence was impermissible character
evidence.

Even if this Court finds that the evidence going to Mr.
Alvarez using a different name or date of birth was sufficient to
allow the jury to infer that he lied to the officer, either
because hearsay and competence questions do not block all the
information from being properly admitted or because even without
the hearsay the jury could infer that he was lying, then the
evidence must still pass muster as character evidence under Utah
Rule of Evidence 404(b).

This is so because false information is
12

a crime, but it is not a crime upon which this jury was required
to deliberate.

It is not relevant to this case.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Evidence tending to show that Mr.

Alvarez was a liar or that he had some other form of character
flaw is not admissible, unless that very evidence is relevant in
that "it tends to prove some material fact to the crime charged."
State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah 1982).
Therefore, character evidence may
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Rule 404(b).

The question once more is one of relevance as

outlined above with the special problem that if this evidence is
not especially probative of some material fact, it will be used
by the jury to show a "general disposition of [the] defendant" to
commit crimes and that is improper.

State v. Featherson, 781

P.2d 424, 427 (Utah 1989) .
In a proffer, the prosecutor stated that the false
information evidence was evidence of guilt in the aggravated
robbery.

The fact that a person gives a false name to an

arresting officer upon arrest for aggravated robbery is not
probative of any element of the aggravated robbery.

It is not

evidence of guilt in the sense.
If the prosecutor meant that it was some evidence of
consciousness of guilt going to prove the mens rea element, this
13

may be more on target.
problem.

However, this case presents a special

The prosecutor might argue this evidence as tending to

show consciousness of guilt, but Mr. Alvarez's argument is that
he wanted to try to avoid problems because he was on probation
for another robbery.

It was stipulated by both counsel that this

probation evidence should not be admissible.

This is the most

likely inference to be drawn from the false information evidence.
However, the jury would never arrive at this inference, because
it would be even more prejudicial and improper to let them know
that Mr. Alvarez was already on probation for a robbery crime.
The jury would most surely use this information to convict Mr.
Alvarez for having committed this sort of crime before.

Given

all facts, the evidence is not probative of consciousness of
guilt.

It is only when the information goes to the jury in

incomplete form as it did here that the evidence appears at all
relevant.
The second reason proffered is that the evidence tends to
rebut the defense that Defendant was too high to think clearly,
an absence of mistake kind of theory.

The evidence as presented,

even in its full form including the hearsay, does not tend to
prove clear or unclear thinking.
The false information evidence should have been excluded.
It does not tend to prove any fact material to this charge.
Instead, it functions as improper character evidence, influencing
the jury to convict Mr. Alvarez because he may have lied to the
officer on the collateral matter.
14

B.
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT, IT WAS
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. ALVAREZ'S CASE.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides in part that
[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury . . . .
If this Court finds that the evidence of the incorrect name
and date of birth is relevant to the present case, it is only
marginally probative.

As outlined above, the critical evidence

going to the incorrectness of the information Mr. Alvarez gave is
hearsay and not admissible to prove that the information was
indeed incorrect.

Additionally, the interaction between the

officer and Mr. Alvarez had more to do with Mr. Alvarez's
probation status than his need to give a different name in the
face of charges that he attempted to rob Smith's.

That he gave

incorrect information to the officer tells the jury little about
his intent within the store.
However, this evidence is highly prejudicial in several
respects.

First, the incorrect name and date of birth evidence

came in without the benefit of Mr. Alvarez's explanation that he
gave the wrong name to avoid arrest on a probation violation.
Even without an arrest for robbery, he was in violation of his
probation because he was high.

The evidence was, therefore,

misleading to the jury who could not hear Defendant's highly
appropriate explanation for his behavior.

This allowed the jury

to assume that he had no real explanation and, therefore, must
have been lying about his name and his intent to rob the store.
15

Trial counsel could not cure this problem by allowing Mr. Alvarez
to explain why he gave a wrong name.

The fact of his probation

could only cause more prejudice against him with the jury.
Second, the information is unfairly prejudicial to Mr.
Alvarez in that it allows the jury to speculate on his intent
within the store by referring to this action with the officer.
The two events, while close in time, are not related.
little evidence going to Mr. Alvarez's intent.

There is

The two versions

of the events in the store are very similar in their details.
What is different between the Smith's employee's version and Mr.
Alvarez's version are the judgments about what his actions meant.
This means that the jury probably looked to an allegation of
false information to decide who to believe concerning events in
the store.

This confuses the real issue and is misleading and

unfairly prejudicial.
Third, officer Scharman explained the fingerprint evidence
in this way:
[t]here was a comparative fingerprint done from the
print I took at the time of the arrest versus some
known prints of the defendant.
(R. 244). Few people have fingerprints on file with law
enforcement agencies.

A permissible inference for the jury to

draw from this information ("known prints of the defendant")
would be that he had been arrested before.

However, this kind of

testimony had already been excluded by stipulation (R. 225).
Officer Scharman had been warned by the judge about making such
statements and acknowledged that he understood (R. 225). This
16

information was extremely prejudicial to Mr. Alvarez and unfairly
so, because it had been properly excluded by the trial court
prior to the witness's testimony.
In weighing the evidence's relevance versus its prejudicial
impact, the trial court made an error.

The evidence was much

less relevant in its trial testimony than as proffered by the
prosecutor.

It was also much more prejudicial in its admitted

than proffered form.

If given an opportunity to fairly weigh the

evidence, the trial court would have come to a different
conclusion.

Utah Appellate courts have found error in similar

situations.
In State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah 1986), a
statement made by the defendant when arrested for a burglary was
found to be admitted at trial in error.

In Pacheco, the

defendant was stopped while driving a car matching a description
given in a burglary investigation.

He consented to a search,

which yielded fruits of the burglary.

When showed a ring taken

from the car, he responded:
I don't know about the ring. It may have been there
from a previous burglary that I just got out of prison
for.
Id. at 193. At trial, all but the portion of his statement
concerning prison was admitted in the State's case-in-chief.

The

Utah Supreme Court found that this was prejudicial error, since
the defendant offered no real explanation other than this
statement for his possession of the ring.

Id,, at 195.

It is

important to note that this statement as admitted gives the false
17

impression that he was admitting to the ring being a recent
burglary.

The statement as a whole makes no such admission but

is too prejudicial to put to the jury.

Mr. Pacheco and Mr.

Alvarez were put in the same predicament and faired just as badly
in the trial.
In State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 1987), a
conviction for possession of cocaine was reversed when drug
ledgers of marginal probative value for the crime charged were
introduced at trial to the unfair prejudice of the defendant.

In

State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 428 (Utah 1989), testimony of
other lewd acts in proximity to the charged rape were found to be
minimally probative on the issue of intent and highly prejudicial
and, therefore, should have been excluded by the trial court.
In a similar manner, all evidence going to alleged false
information given by Mr. Alvarez to Officer Scharman at the time
of arrest should have been excluded by the trial court.

The

evidence was of minimal probative value and unfairly prejudicial
to Mr. Alvarez's case.
C.
THE ADMISSION OF THE FALSE INFORMATION
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The standard of review applied to errors in admission of
evidence is the correction of error standard allowing no
deference to the trial court.
(Utah App. 1991).

State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568

However, underlying the factual determinations

under Rule 403 of probativeness and prejudice made by the court
are given some deference warranting a reversal of the factual
ruling by the appellate court only if "the trial court acted
18

unreasonably in striking the balance."

Id.. In the present case,

the trial court made several errors of the law which this Court
should reject.
The evidence was in part admitted in violation of Utah Rules
of Evidence 602 and 801.

This Court should find that, under the

correction of error standard, Officer Scharmanfs testimony
showing that the name and date of birth were in fact false should
have been excluded as impermissible hearsay.

The remaining false

information evidence should have been excluded under Rules 401
and 402 as not relevant to the case.

Even if the evidence is

relevant, it was error for the trial court not to apply Rule
404(b) in its decision making.

As a matter of law, 404(b)

applies, and this bad act evidence would not be admissible under
that rule.
If this Court still finds some relevance in the testimony
and reaches the Rule 403 issue, the trial court's ruling, which
normally would be given some deference, cannot be given that
deference here.

The incorrect rulings of law happened prior to

the weighing of fact that the trial court was obliged to do under
Rule 403.

There is no way to determine how the admission of

improper evidence affected the factual determinations inherent in
that balancing.

This Court should look at the appropriate

evidence before it and conduct the Rule 403 balancing test on its
own.

Such a rebalancing will show that the trial court committed

reversible error.
[WJhere evidence is shown to have supported only
conjectural inferences which had little probative
19

value, or where no evidence was adduced that showed
that a fact had any causal connection with the crime
charged, reversal may be appropriate on grounds that
the improperly admitted evidence could only have served
to confuse and mislead the jury or to prejudice the
outcome of the case.
DeAlo at 199.
The error was prejudicial in this case, reguiring reversal.
Taylor at 568.

The State has attempted to use this false

information evidence to prove the intent element on the
aggravated robbery charge.
testify to the crime itself.

The State had three eyewitnesses
This was sufficient evidence for

the jury to consider on the issue of intent (Mr. Alvarez is not
saying that the evidence going to intent was sufficient to
establish the requisite intent, only that the jury had all the
information concerning the alleged crime it could possibly have).
Mr. Alvarez's interaction with Officer Scharman offered nothing
more for the jury on this issue.

However, it did create a

significant likelihood that the jury would convict Mr. Alvarez
based on irrelevant matters.

Point II

ATTORNEY LISA J. REMAL'S FAILURE TO CALL A CRUCIAL
WITNESS DENIED MR. ALVAREZ THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for Mr. Alvarez, Lisa J. Remal, called the
defendant, Mr. Alvarez, as the only witness for the defense.
Defense counsel failed to call a crucial witness who could have
bolstered Mr. Alvarez's testimony while undermining the
prosecution witness's credibility.

Attorney Rental's failure to

call this witness was unreasonable under the circumstances and
20

prejudicial to Mr. Alvarez's defense.
A defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has been
interpreted to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel."
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90
1441,1449 n. 14 (1970).

S.Ct.

In determining whether a defendant's

sixth amendment right to counsel has been denied, the Utah
Supreme Court uses the two part test set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)(quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984)).

In addressing the first part of the test and

determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, an
"objective standard of reasonableness" is used.
S.Ct. at 2064.

Id. at 186, 104

Regarding the second part of the test, whether

the defendant was prejudiced thereby, it must be shown that there
is a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."

Id. at 187, 104 S.Ct at 2068.

In determining

whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome exists,
an appellate court must "consider the totality of the evidence,
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the
21

entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how
strongly the verdict is supported by the record.

Templin, 805

P.2d at 187,.
The prosecution presented four witnesses during its case in
chief, only one of which, Vanessa Milton, communicated with Mr.
Alvarez during the alleged crime.

Vanessa Milton testified that

Mr. Alvarez demanded "six fifties," that is, that defendant was
not trying to get 6 fifty-cent pieces for the 3 one-dollar bills
he had in his hand.

In presenting Mr. Alvarez's defense,

attorney Remal presented only the defendant himself, who
testified that his only purpose in going to Smith's that day was
to get 6 fifty-cent pieces for the 3 one-dollar bills he had.
Defense counsel failed to call as a witness, "Jesse" the person
who drove Mr. Alvarez to Smiths on the morning of the alleged
robbery (R. 271). "Jesse," in addition to driving Mr. Alvarez to
Smith's, had, immediately prior to the alleged robbery, purchased
some fifty-cent pieces from the defendant (R. 270-271).

If

attorney Remal had given him an opportunity to testify, he could
have corroborated Mr. Alvarez's reason for going to Smith's,
which was merely to get exchange his 3 one-dollar bills for 6
fifty-cent pieces.

In that "Jesse" was "kind of like an uncle"

(R. 186) to Mr. Alvarez and directly involved in the events
leading up to and including the alleged robbery, attorney Remal
should have called him to testify on Mr. Alvarez's behalf.

Her

failure to do so demonstrates that her representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and, therefore, the first
22

prong of the Strickland test has been met.
Further, the second prong of Strickland

is satisfied.

"Jesse" had an opportunity to observe Mr. Alvarez right up until
the alleged robbery took place. Who better, other than Mr.
Alvarez himself, could testify regarding the defendant's intent
in going to Smith's that morning.

His testimony was important

because it could have bolstered Mr. Alvarez's testimony while
undermining Vanessa Milton's credibility.

Vanessa Milton's

credibility is crucial because her testimony is the only direct
evidence of Mr. Alvarez's guilt.

Because "Jesse's" testimony

would have affected the credibility of the only witness who gave
direct evidence of Mr. Alvarez's guilt, the fact that he did not
testify affects the entire evidentiary picture.

The conviction,

therefore, is not strongly supported by the record.

Admittedly,

it is hard to ascertain the exact effect this witness's testimony
would have on the judgment thus rendered.

However, there exists

a reasonable probability that had this witness testified, the
outcome of the trial would have been different.

Because both

prongs of the Strickland test have been met, Mr. Alvarez was
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel and therefore, his case should be reversed and remanded
for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellant
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM
(Relevant Portions of the Trial Transcript)
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were no- MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I'd object to Mr. Spikes1

testifying.
THE COURT:
hypothetical.

Well, I think he's forming a

Let him finish the question, and then if you

have an objection you can make it. Mr. Spikes.
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

The question, or hypothetical,

would be if you were to be told that it was, in fact,
fingerprinted, and that no usable fingerprints were, in
fact, lifted, I would ask you if that would be unusual in
your experience?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I would object.

this is asking for speculation.

I think

There's also no foundation

upon which the witness can base his answer.
THE COURT:

Well I'm going to sustain the

objection on foundational grounds.
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

You indicated that you placed

Mr. Alvarez under arrest at that point.
A

Yes.

Q

Did you have any conversation with Mr. Alvarez?

Did you attempt to identify him?
A

Yes, sir, I did.

There was no ID on his person,

and I did ask who he was, his date of birth and things of
that nature.
Q

Did it appear to you that he understood what you

r\ r\ r\ M
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were asking such that he could respond?
A

Yes.

Q

And did he, in fact, respond to those questions?

A

Yes, sir, he did.

Q

What name did he give you when you asked him his

A

I believe it was Joseph Madrid, or something of

name?

that nature.
Q

And what date of birth did he give you?

A

I don't recall exactly.

I just recall that the

date of birth, he was a juvenile age.
Q

So what action did you take upon receiving that

information?
A

Because of the nature of the crime, it's policy

dictates for us officers, I took him to the police
department where the SOCO unit photographed him and
fingerprinted him.
Q

Would you indicate what that is?

A

There's officer's mobile crime labs and so forth

there responsible for fingerprints and photographs and
things of that nature.
Q

Did you know what the ultimate process was?

A

Just that we photographed him and fingerprinted

him, I made contact with an uncle, and then I transported
him to the detention center.
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1
2

Q

he, in fact, was not Mr. Madrid?
MS. REMAL:

3
4

7

Your Honor, I'd object without some

further foundation.
THE COURT:

5
6

Do you know at what point it was determined that

Will you lay some additional

foundation, Mr. Spikes?
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

Did you have occasion to

8

discover that the name that he gave you was not, in fact,

9

his true name?

10
11
12
13
14

A

No, sir, I didn't, not until I was subpoenaed

and pulled the case up and read some supplementary reports.
Q

And what information did you gather during, or

through that process?
A

That the information given to me was not- MS. REMAL:

15

Your Honor, it sounds like this is

16

based on hearsay, and I'd object unless there's some other

17

foundation for the answer.

18

THE COURT:

19

the information, if he knows.

20

question, Mr. Spikes.

21

Q

Well he can give his understanding of

(BY MR. SPIKES)

I'll have you rephrase the

How was it that you, in fact,

22

found that there was at least some question concerning the

23

name of Madrid that he gave you?

24

A

From a follow-up detective.

25

Q

Do you know what process, what procedure was

OOP/13
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taken that would occur to determine that?
A

There was a comparative fingerprint done from

the print I took at the time of the arrest versus some
known prints of the defendant,
Q

Okay,

Do you know the results of that

comparison?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, again I'd object, this is

THE COURT:

Overruled, you may answer.

hearsay.

THE WITNESS:

Just I read in the supplementary

record that the individual I arrested versus the print of
the other individual were in fact the same.
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

And with respect to the

juvenile status, based on the date of birth of the
individual that you arrested, did you discover additional
information?
A

That he was an adult, is all.

Q

Did you gather any other evidence from Mr-

Alvarez at the time that you booked him under the name of
Mr. Madrid?
A

The knife and the money is what was placed in

evidenceTHE COURT:

Lean into the microphone, please, and

repeat your answer.
THE WITNESS:

The knife that was taken out of the
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were no- MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I'd object to Mr. Spikes1

testifying.
THE COURT:
hypothetical.

Well, I think he's forming a

Let him finish the question, and then if you

have an objection you can make it. Mr. Spikes.
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

The question, or hypothetical,

would be if you were to be told that it was, in fact,
fingerprinted, and that no usable fingerprints were, in
fact, lifted, I would ask you if that would be unusual in
your experience?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I would object.

this is asking for speculation.

I think

There's also no foundation

upon which the witness can base his answer.
THE COURT:

Well I'm going to sustain the

objection on foundational grounds.
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

You indicated that you placed

Mr. Alvarez under arrest at that point.
A

Yes.

Q

Did you have any conversation with Mr. Alvarez?

Did you attempt to identify him?
A

Yes, sir, I did.

There was no ID on his person,

and I did ask who he was, his date of birth and things of
that nature.
Q

Did it appear to you that he understood what you
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were asking such that he could respond?
A

Yes.

Q

And did he, in fact, respond to those questions?

A

Yes, sir, he did.

Q

What name did he give you when you asked him his

name?
A

I believe it was Joseph Madrid, or something of

that nature.
Q

And what date of birth did he give you?

A

I don't recall exactly.

I just recall that the

date of birth, he was a juvenile age.
Q

So what action did you take upon receiving that

information?
A

Because of the nature of the crime, it's policy

dictates for us officers, I took him to the police
department where the SOCO unit photographed him and
fingerprinted him.
Q

Would you indicate what that is?

A

There's officer's mobile crime labs and so forth

there responsible for fingerprints and photographs and
things of that nature.
Q

Did you know what the ultimate process was?

A

Just that we photographed him and fingerprinted

him, I made contact with an uncle, and then I transported
him to the detention center.
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Q

Do you know at what point it was determined that

he, in fact, was not Mr. Madrid?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I'd object without some

further foundation.
THE COURT:

Will you lay some additional

foundation, Mr. Spikes?
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

Did you have occasion to

discover that the name that he gave you was not, in fact,
his true name?
A

No, sir, I didn't, not until I was subpoenaed

and pulled the case up and read some supplementary reports.
Q

And what information did you gather during, or

through that process?
A

That the information given to me was not- MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, it sounds like this is

based on hearsay, and I'd object unless there's some other
foundation for the answer.
THE COURT:

Well he can give his understanding of

the information, if he knows.

I'll have you rephrase the

question, Mr. Spikes.
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

How was it that you, in fact,

found that there was at least some question concerning the
name of Madrid that he gave you?
A

From a follow-up detective.

Q

Do you know what process, what procedure was
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taken that would occur to determine that?
A

There was a comparative fingerprint done from

the print I took at the time of the arrest versus some
known prints of the defendant.
Q

Okay,

Do you know the results of that

comparison?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, again I'd object, this is

THE COURT:

Overruled, you may answer.

hearsay.

THE WITNESS:

Just I read in the supplementary

record that the individual I arrested versus the print of
the other individual were in fact the same.
Q

(BY MR. SPIKES)

And with respect to the

juvenile status, based on the date of birth of the
individual that you arrested, did you discover additional
information?
A

That he was an adult, is all.

Q

Did you gather any other evidence from Mr.

Alvarez at the time that you booked him under the name of
Mr. Madrid?
A

The knife and the money is what was placed in

evidence.
THE COURT:

Lean into the microphone, please, and

repeat your answer.
THE WITNESS:

The knife that was taken out of the

